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Abstract 
This article analyses the changing political significance of UK balance of payments 
assessment in the post war era, seeking to explain its disappearance as a policy issue 
today. We demonstrate the historically contingent nature of balance of payments 
performance assessment by comparing its shifting, conjunctural, constructions, rooted 
in underlying political economic assumptions, across four periods in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
Century. We argue that the political salience of UK balance of payments assessment 
is contingent upon structural changes (both ideational and material) within the global 
political economy and domestic politics. Changes in the prevailing policy paradigm 
through which balance of payments was interpreted (for example from ‘embedded 
liberalism’ to neo-liberalism), and redefinitions of balance of payments assessment 
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techniques, both of which happened on numerous occasions in the post-war world, 
had the effect of reshaping the nature of the external international political economic 
constraints to which UK governments were subjected.  
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construction of British Economic Performance Assessment 
Abstract 
This article analyses the changing political significance of UK balance of payments 
assessment in the post war era, seeking to explain its disappearance as a policy issue 
today. We demonstrate the historically contingent nature of balance of payments 
performance assessment by comparing its shifting, conjunctural, constructions, rooted 
in underlying political economic assumptions, across four periods in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
Century. We argue that the political salience of UK balance of payments assessment 
is contingent upon structural changes (both ideational and material) within the global 
political economy and domestic politics. Changes in the prevailing policy paradigm 
through which balance of payments was interpreted (for example from ‘embedded 
liberalism’ to neo-liberalism), and redefinitions of balance of payments assessment 
techniques, both of which happened on numerous occasions in the post-war world, 
had the effect of reshaping the nature of the external international political economic 
constraints to which UK governments were subjected.  
Introduction 
In spring 2007 the broadsheet newspapers in Britain reported, for 2006, a particularly 
poor balance of payments performance. Gary Duncan of The Times noted ‘Bleak 
figures showing Britain’s balance of payments plunging deep into the red … the 
current account deficit ballooned to an all-time high of £43.3 billion’.1 This short 
piece, tucked away on an inside page, provoked no media comment, and even the 
official opposition neglected to castigate the government’s economic record in light of 
  
4 
this statistic. If we contrast this scenario with the early post-war years, it illustrates 
how the objectives of economic policy, and the importance attached to certain 
yardsticks by which economic policy success and failure are judged, are inherently 
transient historical constructs. 
For thirty years after 1945 British economic policy was obsessed with the payments 
position; the predominant narrative of the economy in these years was one of 
recurrent balance of payments ‘crises’ (Gamble 1984: 72-90; Eatwell 1982: 131-4; 
Burnham 2003: 14-15). In the post-war era, the constraints of the international 
political economy on the Keynesian welfare state would often ‘bite’ around the issue 
of balance of payments, with, for example, explicit targets often a central feature of 
the Letters of Intent which accompanied stand-by arrangements for borrowing from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2
 The balance of payments, and measurement 
thereof, was a crucial yardstick by which the IMF and others judged national 
economic policy rectitude. As the IMF’s official historian noted, in 1987; ‘From its 
beginning, the Fund’s central concern has been the balance of payments positions of 
its members … As of December 1986, balance of payments adjustment has remained 
a prime, perhaps the prime, issue in the international monetary system and for the 
Fund.’ (de Vries, 1987: 1). According to Eatwell and Taylor, the balance of payments 
continued to be regarded as an economic ‘fundamental’ until the early 1990s; 
Average opinion is reinforced by labelling these beliefs “fundamentals,” as if 
they were revealed truths. For many years it was believed that the UK balance 
of payments was a “fundamental.” Any deficit in the current account would 
result in selling pressure on the pound sterling, as the markets followed their 
beliefs. In the past decade opinion has changed, and the current account is no 
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longer a “fundamental,” so deficits no longer produce the reaction they once 
did. (2000: 13) 
 
Thus today, while the figures are still published in the financial pages, as a UK 
policy problem it has all but disappeared. At the end of their second term, an 
authoritative survey of the economic record of New Labour (Nickell, 2004) discussed 
three macroeconomic criteria-unemployment, growth and inflation. What was once 
the ‘fourth horseman of the apocalypse’, the balance of payments, was nowhere to be 
seen. This is not a consequence of any clear improvement in the payments position. 
What is to count as success in the balance of payments is highly problematic, and is 
the key issue returned to below. Yet on the currently widely employed measure of the 
current account deficit relative to GDP, the UK position over the last two decades has 
been far worse than at any time in the ‘golden age’. Recently, the balance of 
payments position has been particularly weak, and the reserve position has at times 
been in the negative (see Tables 1 & 2).  
 
This article analyses the changing political salience of balance of payments 
assessment, focusing on the changing meanings and significance attached to ‘the’ 
balance of payments at particular key moments during the last fifty years. What is 
most clear is that the balance of payments does not operate as a constraint on the 
British economy in the manner described in economics textbooks. Mainstream 
economics cannot allow the question as to whether or not the balance of payments is a 
real economic constraint to be asked. The IS-LM model, a standard teaching tool of 
macroeconomics, in incorporating the international economy, becomes IS-LM-BP. 
That is, the balance of payments is a real economic constraint by definition.  The 
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questions we ask in this paper are simply not admissible. It is possible that this 
illustrates a performative role for textbook economic models, creating a constraint 
they purport only to describe.
2
 At the very least, what is at play is not an inexorable 
logic, but socially and politically constructed interpretations of economic phenomena.  
 
It follows that the balance of payments assessment must be placed in a historical 
context, with particular focus on 3 areas. Firstly,  the context of broader developments 
in the global political economy (for example fixed or floating exchange rates, high or 
low capital mobility, conditions of global credit creation); secondly, the institutional 
context (for example the role and significance of the IMF, and ratings agencies); and 
thirdly domestic ideological conditions (for example the role and credibility of 
sterling). Crucial within the latter are prevailing understandings of Britain’s 
appropriate international economic position, and articulation with the international 
political economy. Thus the political salience of the balance of payments is contingent 
upon structural changes (both material and ideational) in the global political economy, 
and in British domestic politics. 
 
Constructivist Political Economy 
 
This analysis of the political economy of British balance of payments insists that the 
ideational level must be afforded due weight if we are to understand how and why the 
degree to which the balance of payments ‘matters’ changes over time. Recent social 
constructivist scholarship in British, international and comparative political economy  
has shared this recognition of the independent, causal and constitutive role of ideas, of 
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the ideational, in shaping political economic outcomes and practices (Hall 1993; 
Ruggie 1998; Blyth 1997, 2002; Rosamond 2002; Hay 2004; Sinclair 2005; Abdelal, 
Blyth & Parsons forthcoming). As one leading constructivist summarises the 
approach, ‘the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as 
material’. These ideational factors ‘express not only individual but also collective 
intentionality’ and ‘the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not 
independent of time and place’ (Ruggie 1998:  33).  
 
Sinclair analyses ‘specific institutions and associated “micropractices” at the core of 
contemporary capitalism’ and ‘the “reconfiguring” effect these institutions and 
practices have on global economic and political life’ (Sinclair 2005: 10-11; see also 
Ruggie 1998: 27). Our analysis is motivated by a similar explanatory ambition to 
explore the historical development of ‘intersubjective structures’ or ‘interpretive 
frames [that] actors use to understand the world’ (Sinclair 2005: 10-12). We are 
interested in how ‘economic ideas provide agents with an interpretive framework, 
which describes and accounts for the workings of the economy by defining its 
constitutive elements and “proper” (and therefore “improper”) interrelations.’ (Blyth 
2002: 11) 
 
When particular intersubjective beliefs become sufficiently embedded they develop 
the quality of social facts, resting on ‘collective intentionality’ (Searle 1995: 24-5; 
Ruggie 1998: 13 & 20-1; Sinclair 2005: 53-4). These play a constitutive role in 
shaping political economic outcomes in that they guide collective intentionality, 
shaping the meaning and significance attached to economic phenomena. In Ruggie’s 
celebrated example of how  ‘collective intentionality creates meaning’, the ‘embedded 
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liberal’ compromise of the Bretton Woods era  ‘established intersubjective 
frameworks of meaning that included a shared narrative about the conditions that had 
made these regimes necessary’ (Ruggie 1998: 21). Embedded liberalism thus 
established a set of social facts which generated a ‘grammar’ as the basis for future 
interpretation of appropriateness of acts.  
 
Social facts are not timeless, impermeable ideational structures. One interpretation of 
why changes in these ideational structures occur is that they respond to changing 
material circumstances. This is plausible, but it does not exhaust the possibilities. 
Both ‘material and ideational factors stand in mutually conditioning relationships’ 
(Ruggie 1998:  32). Thus there is a relative autonomy of the ideational from ‘material 
conditions’. In recognising this causal and constitutive role for ideas, we perceive a 
dialectical relation between the ideational and the material. What Dyson has termed 
‘the underlying importance of ideas as real phenomena and of their internalisation by 
domestic elites’ which ‘underlines the complex interweaving and mutual 
interdependence between the material and the ideational.’ (2000: 647) We recognise 
that material conditions do establish parameters which delimit the range of possibly 
prevailing ideational constructions of political economic reality. Nevertheless, there is 
significant room to manoeuvre within these parameters. As Blyth puts it, ideas ‘do not 
“really” need to correspond to the “real” world in order to be important in that world’ 
(Blyth 2002: viii). Indeed, some of these highly significant ‘intersubjective 
constructions’ have ‘at best a tenuous relationship to market fundamentals and no 
precise calculable metric’ (Blyth 2002: 43). As Keynes pointed out in an early 
constructivist approach to financial credibility in financial markets, with his beauty 
contest analogy (1936: 156), markets are often less interested in the economic 
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fundamentals than in other actors’ (not necessarily exhaustively well informed) 
perceptions. These perceptions are in turn swayed by prevailing political economic 
orthodoxy which, itself, may not be closely rooted in an analysis of the economic 
fundamentals.  
 
The reason why particular sets of ideational structures are prioritised over others rests 
on a Polanyian approach to understanding the configuration of the domestic and 
international political economy and their inter-relationship as a complex whole. From 
this point of view one gets a sense of the ‘goodness of fit’ with global political 
economic conditions and domestic priorities. Polanyi noted how a particular variant of 
‘the liberal creed’ came to be accepted within domestic and international political 
economy as orthodoxy in part because of its compatibility and congruence with global 
political economic conditions (2001: 141-7). Situating analysis of a particular national 
context in a broader international political and economic context, Polanyi highlighted 
how within a particular configuration of international economic relations, certain 
ideas (and policies, and institutions) were prioritised.  
 
Constructing the Balance of Payments  
 
In staking a claim for Keynes as the godfather of constructivist political economy, 
Blyth notes ‘[i]n essence, the economy for Keynes is as much a subjective construct 
as an objective reality’ (Blyth 2002: 42). The empirical discussion of changing 
balance of payments assessment below unambiguously demonstrates how supposedly 
material facts of the world economy in fact rest on an intricate interweaving of the 
ideational and material. This is particularly (but not exclusively) true of the balance of 
  
10 
payments. What to count, how to count it, and where to place it on the balance sheet is 
an arbitrary decision (Block 1977: 140) and a social construction.  
 
We seek to understand the ways in which the balance of payments as an issue has 
been constructed and reconstructed, arguing that there has never been a singular 
‘problem’, rather a changing series of problems constructed through contemporary 
analytic and political conjunctures. As Fred Block’s celebrated analysis, The Origins 
of International Economic Disorder demonstrated, why and how the balance of 
payments ‘matters’ is a complex issue (1977). The balance of payments position does 
not, in any straightforward sense, offer an objective ‘reading’ of underlying economic 
fundamentals. Indeed, balance of payments assessments are not objective in the sense 
that what makes the ‘true’ or ‘false’ is ‘independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings 
about them’ (Searle 1995: 8). Rather, they must be carefully unpacked and 
interrogated. This is because balance of payments assessments are not ‘brute’ facts 
(independent of any institutions), but social facts (Searle 1995: 27).  
 
Block identified ‘two important realities about the balance of payments’ (1977: 140). 
A tantalising passage illustrates the combination of arbitrary ideational construction 
and real material impact which characterized, in the period Block was describing, the 
nature and significance of the balance of payments within the international political 
economy;  
 
 ‘The first is that balance of payments accounting is a matter of choosing 
among different conventions, each of which makes a number of arbitrary 
assumptions; in short there is no “objective” technique for analyzing a 
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country’s international payments position. The second is that the 
determination that a particular country is running a chronic payments deficit 
or surplus has very serious international political implications. The paradox is 
that an interpretation of a country’s international payments position that is 
inevitably somewhat arbitrary has serious consequences because the 
interpretation affects the actual behaviour of nations and of international 
agencies.’ (1977: 140) 
 
In similar vein, Machlup warned against the dual dangers of ‘misplaced concreteness 
and disguised politics’ (1964: 120) in analysis of the balance of payments. Thirlwall 
and Gibson, in recognition of the ‘arbitrariness’ of choice of its components, note that 
the ‘balance of payments deficit cannot be measured, it can only be analysed’ (1992, 
13; see also Brittan 1970: xiii; Strange 1976: 187). Balance of payments assessments, 
as social facts, rest upon particular (contingent social constructions of) political 
economic assumptions.  
 
Whether or not they do so is, as noted above, contingent upon the institutional 
context, the global market conditions (the prevailing views of market actors), and on 
domestic political conditions. In the ideational realm within the global political 
economy and British domestic politics, what matters (or does not) in balance of 
payments assessment is mediated by paradigms of economic ideas (Hall 1993; Blyth 
2002: 11). For Block, ‘the debate about proper interpretation of the balance of 
payments is really an argument about the appropriate ways for nations to organize 
their international economic transactions … there is an implicit conception of what 
that country’s payments position should look like’ (1977: 140). The underlying 
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normative structure within which balance of payments analysis and interpretation is 
situated – the prevailing political economic paradigm - is of cardinal importance.  
 
These ‘intersubjective frameworks’ (Blyth 1997, 232-3, 236; Ruggie 1998) are 
‘internalised by politicians, state-managers and policy experts alike and may become 
institutionally embedded in norms, conventions and standard operating procedures’ 
(Hay 2004: 504). This is akin to Machlup’s ‘disguised politics’ within balance of 
payments analysis (1964: 124). These social constructions of political economic ideas, 
distilled into paradigms, can shape material conditions. As Rosamond puts it, ‘an idea 
can become sedimented and ‘banal’ in the sense of becoming commonsensical and 
barely discussed’ and these  ‘emergent intersubjectivities’ are important ‘because of 
the ways they help to structure both perceptions and arguments amongst policy actors’ 
(Rosamond 2002: 158). 
 
In relation to the balance of payments in the post-war era, paradigm shifts transformed 
notions of the desirability (or otherwise) of heightened capital mobility, of short-term 
and long-term capital flows, and of public and private investment and spending. In 
each case, the prevailing wisdom fed through into a particular framing and mode of 
assessment of the balance of payments. Thus balance of payments interpretation rests 
on broader political economic understandings. These paradigms ‘come to define 
legitimate and appropriate action’ and serves to ‘delimit a range of feasible policy 
options in any given context, providing cognitive templates through which policy-
makers come to understand the environment in which they find themselves.’ (Hay 
2004: 504-5; see also Campbell 2001: 160, 170-3; Hall 1993). 
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British Economic Policy and the Balance of Payments  
  
Mindful of what one IMF Official called these ‘treacherous quicksands of balance of 
payments statements,’3 and the inherently ‘subjective dimension of balance of 
payments analysis’ (Block 1977: 140) we eschew any idea of asserting how the ‘true’ 
balance of payments position should be calculated. Rather, we analyse diachronically 
the changing meanings and significance attached to ‘the’ UK balance of payments. At 
a press conference in Washington on 3 December 1965 the following exchange too 
place: Reporter: ‘why do you have balance of payments problems now when you 
didn’t have them 50 years ago?’ James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
replied: ‘there were no balance of payments problems 50 years ago because there 
were no balance of payments statistics’. (Lindert 1969, p.36)  Callaghan was right that 
the statistical aspect is important, and we return to it below, but even more significant 
is the recognition of the historical, contingent nature of the very existence of the 
problem. This section highlights the changing political economic significance (and 
normative underpinnings) of the interpretive framework within which balance of 
payments assessment is situated. We demonstrate this by comparing and 
contextualising the British balance of payments ‘problem’ (or non-problem) across 
four periods in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 Century. 
 
Pre-World War Two 
 
The first period we consider briefly is the pre World War Two era. Before 1914 
Britain was on the gold standard, and under that regime the authorities’ prime concern 
was the state of the gold reserves, coupled to a free trade regime. The ideational 
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context was one of attachment to what Polanyi termed ‘the liberal creed’ and the 
attendant notion of ‘self-regulating’ markets (Polanyi 2001[1944] 3-5; Block 2001: 
xxxix-xxxiii; Eichengreen 1996: 7-44; Kettell 2004: 33-35), operating through the 
Gold Standard. This was in turn built on a particular view of the ‘appropriate’ 
articulation between the British political economy and the wider global political 
economy, rooted in Britain’s pre-eminence within the world economy in the 19th 
Century. Serious ‘credibility’ concerns about the British economy and its currency 
had not arisen since the suspension of the gold standard during the Napoleonic Wars. 
The British state had not constructed the concept of the ‘balance of payments’ (Sayers 
1976, 29), and this was reflected in the nature of the economic data collected. Only 
monthly import and export figures were collected, but even these were a consequence 
of now superseded trade regulation.   
 
The disruptive effects of First World War inaugurated the collection of much more 
data. The first official current account figures were published in 1923, and data on 
capital transactions started to appear around the same time. (Foot 1972) But with the 
return to gold in 1925 reserves remained the central international economic policy 
concern. The old ‘self-regulating market’ mental furniture still endured (Polanyi 
2001[1944] 31-32, 79-80). Linked to this was a conception on the appropriate 
organisation of Britain’s international economic relations which attached great 
importance to Britain’s capacity to export capital; indeed down to 1926 what we 
would now call the current account was ‘surplus available for investment abroad’ 
(Foot 1972, 358).  
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Thus partly because of international economic structures (the Gold Standard), and 
partly because of prevailing policy priorities (export of capital), the technique had not 
been developed to measure and assess the balance of payments, and it was not a 
salient political issue in this period. After departure from gold in 1931, Britain’s 
international position improved markedly through capital inflows, making balance of 
payments concerns still less likely to emerge. 
 
Post-War Reconstruction 
 
A new international political economic context was inaugurated by the end Second 
World War, with the establishment of the Bretton Woods order of fixed exchange 
rates. Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the perceived significance of the UK 
balance of payments increased. This political salience  in part resulted from the new 
configuration of world order at the end of World War Two, the onset of what Cox has 
termed ‘Pax Americana’ (1987: 7, 108). Burnham notes a ‘revolution in the 
international economy resulting from the impoverishment of the UK and the 
transformation of Britain from the world’s biggest creditor to the world’s biggest 
debtor’ (2003: 7-8). Sterling’s deterioration when the US strong-armed Britain into 
premature convertibility in 1946 culminated in economic crisis and Bretton Woods 
system ‘shut down’ in 1947 (Burnham 2003: 1, 6-7). UK capacity to finance imports, 
especially from the dollar area, was a key strategic and policy issue. This was amply 
demonstrated by the 1951 balance of payments crisis. The dollar shortage in the post-
war period encouraged the construction of a new discourse of the balance of 
payments, focused on increasing exports and invisible earnings as well an increasing 
share of world trade (Burnham 2003: 11-17). 
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Increasing political salience was also related to the IMF, which exercised oversight 
functions within the international monetary system, and played a constitutive role in 
shaping approaches to the balance of payments (de Vries 1987: 9-24). By the 1950s 
and 1960s, the IMF also offered significant assistance to members in resolving 
payments imbalances. State statistical and economic reporting techniques had 
advanced substantially. The collection of much more data was underpinned by the 
creation of international norms for these statistics, under the aegis of the IMF. This 
extensive data collection provided the foundations upon which balance of payments 
assessments could be built. Meanwhile ‘emergent intersubjectivites’ amongst IMF 
and national policy elites as well as academic economists, were developing a set of 
understandings about how this assessment could be arrived at.  
 
In his foundational work on the balance of payments, Meade noted that the term ‘is 
often used loosely, without any precise definition of what it is intended to cover, and 
such loose usage of the term is the cause of much muddled thinking on the subject’ 
(1951: 3). His answer to the muddle was to differentiate ‘autonomous’ from 
‘accommodating’ transactions, and to argue it was deficit in the former which should 
define the problem (Meade 1951: 11-13). This influential account aligned with the 
approach taken by the IMF (Thirlwall & Gibson 1992). 
 
For Meade, as the IMF historian quotes, the policy problem of restoring external 
balance ‘is closely bound up with the problem of maintaining a high and stable level 
of economic activity [and] full employment in the country suffering  from the 
disequilibrium in its balance of payments’ (de Vries 1987: 5; see also James 1996: 31-
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3; Burnham 2003: 5-6). The economic policy paradigm which shaped the early 
deliberations of fund officials had a decidedly embedded liberal flavour (Ruggie 
1982). The key policy issue was the search ‘alternatives to domestic deflation’ for 
countries with balance of payments deficits, and ‘the new objective of public officials 
was to simultaneously attain and maintain internal equilibrium (full employment) and 
external equilibrium (balance of payments equilibrium)’ (de Vries 1987: 9). The 
absorption approach to balance of payments, developed by the Fund, was favoured in 
the late 1940s over the elasticities approach because it was ‘more in keeping with the 
new Keynesian framework of macroeconomic analysis’ (de Vries 1987: 18). 
 
At the time of Bretton Woods attitudes to international capital movements were 
shaped by two understandings. These distilled the essence of the embedded liberal 
policy paradigm. Firstly, that a significant part of the problems of the inter-war 
international economy had been caused by flows of short-term ‘hot’ money, and that 
the new system should limit such (destabilising and problematic) movements and 
allow national governments to pursue full employment policies without disruption by 
speculative flows (de Vries 1987: 8-11; James 1996: 32, 37-9). Secondly, that flows 
of long-term capital were vital to the spread of prosperity outside the metropolitan 
centres. The policies that resulted from these ideas involved extensive capital controls 
to prevent de-stabilising flows while not ruling out long-term ‘productive’ 
international investment, especially, in the British case, in the sterling area (Conan 
1961: 10-15; Eichengreen 1996, 93-6; Schenk 1994, ch.4).  
 
The distinction between short-term and long-term capital flows was a crucial part of 
the mental furniture used to describe and understand the international context of 
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economic policy. Accordingly, the balance of payments statistics attempted to capture 
and reflect this distinction between undesirable short-term and desirable long-term 
flows. It was thus registered in the ‘basic balance’. While much of the public balance 
of payments rhetoric in the 1950s and 1960s focused on the current account (and more 
narrowly on the visible trade balance), for operational policy purposes the key figure 
was the ‘basic balance’ (used in calculation of the balance of payments in the US up 
to 1955, UK to 1970). It comprised the sum of current account plus long-term capital 
movements, with the idea of abstracting from short-term capital flows.  
 
The ‘Basic balance’ attempted to reflect the distinction between long term and short 
term capital flows enshrined in the Bretton Woods agreement, and was the 
measurement which was used to define targets agreed with the IMF in the context of 
stand-by arrangements. The logic of the basic balance focus followed Meade’s 
distinction noted above between ‘autonomous’ and ‘accommodating’ elements, in the 
belief that both elements in the basic balance should be regarded as autonomous, and 
short-term capital movements accommodating; reserves would then be required to be 
used if the deficit on basic balance was insufficiently offset by short-term flows. 
Linked to this was the concern with reserve levels, which formed the key quantitative 
balance of payments target of the authorities in the post-war period (Thirlwall 1980, 
7-8; for problems of the statistics of capital flows, see Hazelwood 1962, 173-183; 
Schenk 1994, 93-8). 
 
Within domestic British politics, balance of payments issues were constructed in the 
light of underlying assumptions. The late 1940s saw an unprecedented public policy 
focus on encouragement of exports, with general slogans like ‘we export or die’ or 
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ones aimed at specific industries like ‘England’s bread hangs by Lancashire’s thread’. 
These campaigns encouraged the view that the balance of payments ‘problem’ lay in 
the current account, and especially the visible account, and specifically with 
manufacturing. This is not an interpretation that can simply be read off from a 
dispassionate assessment of ‘the economic fundamentals’ of Britain’s international 
competitive position. Rather, such an interpretation only makes sense in the light of 
‘sedimented’ ideas about Britain’s international economic relations which were at the 
time ‘banal’, ‘commonsensical and barely discussed’ (Rosamond 2002: 158).  
 
The limits of acceptable policy (Campbell 2001, Hay 2004) did not extend to reining 
in Britain’s overseas capital investment habits in a manner consistent with her 
underlying economic position. There was an inbuilt normative judgement of the 
‘appropriate’ level of overseas investment the British economy should be engaging in, 
and lurking behind this, a sense of Britain’s appropriate place in the reconfigured 
post-war international economic order. Despite Keynes’ warning of Britain’s 
‘Financial Dunkirk’ (Keynes 1945/1979, 374, 410), to an extraordinary extent given 
the ‘austerity’ of these times, Britain in the late 1940s re-built its overseas 
investments, while simultaneously spending very large sums on international military 
and strategic goals (Cairncross 1986, Tomlinson 1996). 
 
1960s and 1970s 
 
The third period we consider is the 1960s. Here the role of a shifting global political 
economy context is thrown into sharp relief, as key shifts in that context, notably the 
move to convertibility in 1958 (Burnham 2003: 2), and the substantial increase in 
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international capital mobility (Kenen & Eichengreen 1994: 7, 28), help explain the 
changing political salience of balance of payments assessment. As sterling was 
progressively freed from controls in the 1950s, but continued its role as an 
international currency, the authorities had to have increasing concern for the 
consequences of domestic policy for financial confidence. Thus capital mobility was 
recognized by the UK government to be a problem because of the frequent foreign 
exchange crises, driven predominantly by short-term capital flows, not the current 
account (Hirsch 1965, 47-8). Such credibility concerns fed through into increased 
significance attached to balance of payments reporting. The UK government’s 
response to this problem was to focus on trying to increase the current account surplus 
in order to build up the reserves and provide a bigger buffer against losses of 
confidence (Radcliffe, 1958 para. 62).  
 
Yet this construction of the balance of payments policy ‘problem’ neglected plausible 
alternatives. The case for the export of capital on a large scale and high levels of 
government overseas expenditure were debated by policy-makers behind the scenes, 
but in public policy pronouncements were treated as ‘givens’, unshakeable articles of 
faith within the prevailing policy paradigm. The issue, therefore, was how these could 
be financed (Schenk 1994, 89-93; Tiratsoo and Tomlinson 1998, 24). The answer, to 
further expand the current account surplus, led to ‘displacement’ of attention from the 
capital to the current account, treating the latter as a ‘problem’ even though it was in 
substantial surplus. (Middleton 2002, 105-107; cf Paish 1956) This displacement 
flowed from a particular understanding of the appropriate articulation between the UK 
economy (and its capital flows) and the wider global political economy. The social 
fact of this interpretation, rooted more in delusions of grandeur than the brute facts of 
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Britain’s economic fundamentals in the wake of its ‘financial Dunkirk’, was of 
cardinal importance for British economic policy making (and perceptions of Britain’s 
economic competitiveness) in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Two contemporary lines of critique of the government approach to the balance of 
payments help expose the underlying assumptions made by the government. Each 
presents a case for how the economic fundamentals could provoke a very different 
policy response, and construction of the balance of payments position.  The first axis 
of criticism relates to imperial overstretch arguments, which see the balance of 
payments problem as resulting primarily from Britain hubristically adhering to an 
unsustainable status for sterling. Shonfield (1958), supported later by Hirsch (1965) 
and Strange (1971), argued Britain was over-reaching itself internationally. Excessive 
government spending overseas, excessive overseas investment, but above all policies 
of defence of the role of sterling and the sterling area entailed excessive focus on 
financial confidence at the expense of domestic policy goals. In this argument the 
balance of payments, as demonstrated by current account surpluses, was not really the 
problem.  The real problem, these critics argued, was not lack of competitiveness, but 
of the ‘overstretch’ of British resources. 
 
Manser provided a second axis of critique of the prevailing balance of payments 
orthodoxy (and the political economic paradigm on which it was built), rooted in an 
understanding of the appropriate role for the public and the private sectors in UK 
international transactions (1971). Manser’s work was stimulated by the recurrent 
balance of payments crises of the 1960s, driven by sterling’s flagging credibility 
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amidst over-valuation and increasing international capital mobility, culminating in the 
traumas surrounding devaluation in 1967. Emphasising a dichotomy between the 
international transactions of the private sector (which earned a surplus), and those of 
the government (which generated a deficit), Manser’s central thesis was clear: ‘Britain 
does not run a commercial deficit; she runs a political and military deficit. For the 
cause of her payments imbalance we need look no farther than official activity. If 
there were no Government spending, there would be no deficit, and no balance of 
payments problem’. (1971, 30) 
 
Manser argued that the problem of the balance of payments had been grossly 
exaggerated and used to justify dubious government meddling (1971, 209-210). But 
alongside this political polemic was a serious point about the ambiguities of the 
balance of payments figures. At a minimum it is odd how much the Labour 
government of the 1960s, like its predecessors, focused so much public attention on 
visible trade when a deficit in this category had been normal for 150 years (Manser 
1971, 6-17). What had changed was to political salience of the balance of payments, 
given the international political economic context of capital mobility and fixed 
exchange rates, combined with Britain’s diminished international position, but 
enduring attachment to sterling as a world currency, and taste for capital export. 
 
In addition to debates about how the balance of payments ‘problem’ should be 
interpreted, and the underlying policy choices it reflected, there were significant 
changes in the very process of registering the balance of payments position in this 
period. These throw into relief the balance of payments as social fact rooted in 
(contingent social constructions of) economic assumptions, and policy paradigms. 
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The changing scale and speed of capital mobility, and the degree to which such 
capital flows were outside national regulatory control, led to a transformation in UK 
balance of payments assessment and statistical presentation. This illustrated well the 
arbitrariness and malleability of balance of payments reporting. In 1969, officials 
recorded an ‘increasing difficulty in drawing a useful line between short-term and 
long-term capital transactions’.4 At the same time a senior Treasury official noted 
how attempting to draw a distinction between short-term and long-term capital was at 
odds with ‘the development of the world capital market which is graduated between 
the long and the short ends of a spectrum’.5 In particular, the Euro-dollar markets 
were highlighted; ‘The magnitude of these transactions has grown steeply, to a point 
at which the present long-term capital account is useless as a measure of the success 
of Government policies’.6 Furthermore, ‘these transactions take place in a world 
financial and commercial centre, only very partially subject to Government and 
central bank control’.7  
 
This created difficulties in assessing key policy-relevant issues, such as ‘the problem 
of liquidity of the U.K. overseas financing position [which] is very difficult to present, 
particularly given the size and practically unknown composition of the Euro-Dollar 
borrowing and lending’.8 The problem was that balance of payments policy-making 
was no longer well-served by the ‘basic balance’ framing. Indeed, officials argued 
‘the divergence of statistics from policy is the clearest example of the need to get 
away altogether from the “basic balance”, and its sharp division of long-term from 
short-term capital. This does not fit the shape of the modern international capital 
market at all.’ 9 The view emerged that the ‘present form of the balance of payments 
has become increasingly unsatisfactory. The sharp growth of Euro-dollar financing of 
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outward investment has made a fairly early change desirable’.10 After the change in 
1970, the UK balance of payments statistics ceased to attempt to record a distinction 
between short-term and long-term capital flows. In the UK before 1970, all monetary 
movements, including private short term capital movements were regarded as 
accommodating or financing the deficit or surplus. Then, with the shift to the total 
currency flow model, it became UK practice to ‘consider private short term capital 
movements as contributing to deficit or surplus, with only official monetary 
transactions accommodating the resulting deficit or surplus’ (Thirlwall & Gibson 
1992, 8-9).  
 
As noted above, the intellectual framework for analysis and paradigm within which 
balance of payments issues are considered is a vital prism mediating the significance 
and impact of balance of payments data. Such interpretation and framing of the 
balance of payments is influenced by key conceptual distinctions within the 
discussion of international economic policy constraints. These are rooted in 
underlying assumptions about how the international political economy should be 
ordered. The ‘Keynesian’ distinction between short-term and long-term flows was 
thus abolished, and replaced by a single category of ’investment and other 
transactions’ and another entitled ‘official financing’. The latter brought together all 
the transactions by the British monetary authorities, and was the underlying number 
for the purpose of reserve management. 
 
This illustrates the significance not just the change in material conditions (greater 
capital mobility, increasingly beyond government control), but also the changing 
ideational context. The intellectual prism through which the policy issues arising from 
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such heightened capital mobility was interpreted had shifted from the early 
‘embedded liberal’ norms which saw short-term flows as undesirable. The New Right 
and the emergent neo-liberal orthodoxy saw capital flows, both short-term and long-
term, as beneficial, and all part of the process of markets allocating resources 
efficiently. This demonstrates how, as noted above, balance of payments positions are 
‘social facts’ (Ruggie 1998; Searle 1995; Sinclair, 2005, 54), rooted in collective 
intentionality, and reflecting the prevailing orthodoxy. The result was that, after 1970, 
short-term capital flows were not (and indeed could not be) a focus of balance of 
payments policy, because the statistical apparatus ceased to be able to register them. 
 
Floating Exchange Rates and the ‘decentralized globalisation’ of credit 
 
The 1980s saw further important shifts in the global political economy context. The 
shift to floating rates from the early 1970s was but part of a wider set of international 
political economic changes which altered prevailing perceptions of balance of 
payments ‘problems’ and imbalances, and also the role and significance of the IMF in 
addressing them. The early 1970s saw the beginnings of a process characterized by 
Germain as ‘the progressive privatization of the global credit system’ (1997, 104), 
which saw the IMF’s role in balance of payments adjustment greatly reduced. This 
‘decentralized globalization’ of credit creation facilitated access to private sources of 
credit for governments (Germain 1997, 91-3). Increased availability of private sources 
of credit within globalising financial markets illustrates the role of capital mobility as 
an opportunity for national governments, as well as a constraint. As a consequence of 
the scale of capital flows following liberalization of international capital markets, 
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countries were far more likely than before to be able to finance a current account 
deficit by capital inflow.  
 
In terms of the institutional context of balance of payments assessment and financing, 
this gazumped official attempts to increase liquidity within the international monetary 
system, through Special Drawing Rights, which the IMF had been negotiating since 
the early 1960s (James 1996, 174; de Vries 1987, 96-7 & 121-2). The ‘decentralized 
globalization’ of credit creation transformed payments imbalance financing within the 
international political economy. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the IMF was (through 
regular surveillance visits tied to lending and stand-by arrangements) still seeking to 
play a central role in Britain’s efforts to achieve balance of payments. However, 
Germain discerns a ‘slow shift away from the IMF and towards the Eurocurrency 
markets’ in balance of payments deficit financing with Eurocurrency markets 
considered ‘a less onerous provider of funds’ than the IMF (1997, 92). The upshot 
was that,  ‘whether it is deciding who has access to credit or who assumes the role of 
balance of payments financier, private banking authorities today play a more central 
role in the organization of credit than they did throughout the Bretton Woods period’ 
(Germain 1997, 104). 
 
This is significant in changing the parameters of balance of payments adjustments, 
and the policy consequences of payments imbalances. By the early 1980s, for 
example, de Vries notes a ‘decrease in concern with the problems of confidence in 
reserve media and of liquidity’ (1987, 97).  The possibility of financing through 
global financial markets reduced – for advanced economies – the political salience of 
balance of payments positions. Governments with credibility in advanced industrial 
  
27 
economies, faced with imbalances, need not arrange bridging loans with the IMF. 
They can ‘adjust domestic interest rates to attract an inflow of capital commensurate 
with the current account deficit. The private firms or citizens involved in such 
borrowing will have been motivated by rates of return, relative risk and so on, and not 
with the financing of a trade deficit’ (Coutts & Godley 1992, 65; cf. McCombie & 
Thirlwall 1992, 68-72).  
 
The ideational context, too, had evolved. Manser offered a conservative and decidedly 
un-Keynesian take which identified the problem as government extravagance 
obscuring the success of the private sector. This was a straw in the wind of a shifting 
political economic orthodoxy (Gamble 1986), heralding a reinvigoration of the 
‘liberal creed’ and emphasis on ‘self-regulating’ markets. To illustrate this point, we 
need only look to how this shift was refracted through the international economic 
institutional context which plays a role in shaping credibility. One example is the 
criteria used by actors in the privatized global credit system when purchasing 
government debt. These judgements about national economic credibility have 
important consequences for interest rates, but they also tell us much about what is, or 
is not, deemed to ‘matter’ within global financial markets (Sinclair, 2005). These 
yardsticks of economic rectitude illustrate how the ideational shift toward neo-liberal 
political economy permeated through institutional changes, and reduced the political 
salience of the balance of payments. For advanced economies, the balance of 
payments position does not feature amongst these credibility tests (Eatwell & Taylor 
2000). Instead, these financial market actors tend to focus on inflation and public 
deficit levels (Mosley 2000; 2003). This is perhaps in part because of the relative ease 
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of interpreting and applying these indicators, which contrasts with the complexity of 
balance of payments determination and assessment already highlighted.  
 
More fundamentally, it throws into relief the shift in prevailing political economic 
assumptions and orthodoxy. These markets are governed by the average opinion of 
what the average opinion might be (Keynes 1964[1936]: 156). They are thus 
dominated by the simple slogans popularised in the monetarist and neo-liberal 
backlash against Keynesianism which was contemporaneous to their deregulation and 
ascendancy, “larger fiscal deficits lead to higher interest rates, an increased money 
supply results in higher inflation, public expenditure bad, private expenditure 
good.”(Eatwell 1995 : 279; Hutton 1994 : 207) Tagged onto these platitudes is a shift 
in the interpretation of the balance of payments as a policy issue. The neo-liberal 
political economic vision championed free markets, and, in some iterations, assumed 
away balance of payments ‘problems’ under floating exchange rates (Friedman 1953). 
The empirical and theoretical foundations of this neo-liberal view that balance of 
payments problems are ‘solved’ by the automatic adjustment processes of free 
international markets under floating exchange rates are dubious (IMF 1984: 5-8; 
Thirlwall & Gibson 1992: 244; Zis 2004: 276-9). Nevertheless, this proved an 
attractive ideational construct, not least in a context of increasing scale and speed of 
international capital mobility. This made assessing balance of payments problems 
much more tricky (see e.g. de Vries 1987, 82), and policy-makers found it 
increasingly difficult to meet targets, and scaled down their ambitions with relation to 
balance of payments objectives (Burns, 1996: 3-4). 
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This shift in ideational and institutional context fed through into a further significant 
change in official balance of payments reporting which once again illustrates the 
arbitrariness of UK balance of payments measurement and assessment. In 1985, the 
‘official financing’ category was discontinued, and the elements of this figure 
distributed elsewhere in the payments data. The reason for this was because, as the 
Balance of Payments ‘Pink Book’ (HMSO 1986, 1) put it, the notion of official 
financing had ‘lost much of its significance’ because ‘over recent years…the 
monetary authorities’ use of the reserves for balance of payments related purposes has 
been much reduced.’ The new representation also can be seen as undercutting the 
significance of the private / public distinction in international economic transactions. 
Thus, since 1985, ‘private and public transactions in capital are now lumped together 
in the accounts … the change in presentation effectively does away with an official 
concept of what constitutes balance of payments disequilibrium’ (Thirlwall & Gibson 
1992, 11).  
 
The implication of this change cannot be overestimated for balance of payments 
policy. With it, the idea of a reserves policy has disappeared, so the idea that the 
authorities can calculate an optimum level of reserves given the international 
asset/liability structure has been abandoned. This crucially undercuts the idea of the 
balance of payments as a separate concern of public policy; there is now no 
independent instrument of measurement to inform such a policy. This is an example 
of what Hall call’s ‘third order change’, or a fundamental, paradigmatic shift 
involving ‘simultaneous changes in all three components of policy: the instrument 
settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy’ (Hall, 
1993: 279).  
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Once again, the shift was brought about by material and ideational changes in the 
international political economic context in which attempts were being made to 
measure the balance of payments. Materially, the speed and scale of capital flows was 
continuing to pose problems for balance of payments assessment and policy. 
Ideationally, changing political economy orthodoxy, and a neo-liberal creed, changed 
the balance of payments policy paradigm on the not wholly tenable assumption that 
with floating exchange rates, free markets resolve balance of payments problems. 
 
Whilst the new balance of payments assessment techniques reduced the significance 
of the public / private distinction, in the policy discourse surrounding balance of 
payments issues, the public / private distinction was becoming increasingly salient, 
with considerable policy consequences. Indeed, it was being deployed to re-describe 
Britain’s balance of payments situation in such a way as to make its problematic 
quality disappear. As noted above, as early as 1971, Manser’s critique had suggested 
public sector extravagance as the key balance of payments problem, and this notion 
found resonance in the Thatcher years. Congdon argued that the ‘claim that the central 
misunderstanding of traditional theories has been to regard the balance of payments 
problem as distinct from the problems of the budget deficit and government debt 
sales. The provocative conclusion here is that these supposedly independent problems 
are, in fact, one and the same’ (1982, 1). Congdon teasingly christens this argument 
the ‘fiscal’ theory of the balance of payments, arguing ‘by stating the problem in 
fiscal terms some fresh insights have been generated. We have identified the 
government as the most likely culprit for an unsustainable imbalance on official 
settlements’ (Congdon 1982, 7-8).    
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Such arguments underpinned a change in the policy paradigm surrounding the balance 
of payments in the mid-to-late 1980s. The neo-liberal political economy of the 
Thatcher governments held as an article of faith that, ‘provided that the overall fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate framework is sound, and markets are working 
effectively, the results of the private sector’s economic activity should not normally 
be something in which it is sensible for the government to interfere’ (Lawson 1988, 
16). Lawson as Chancellor applied this principle to balance of payments policy, 
distinguishing between public and private activity in a novel manner. He argued of the 
UK current account deficit in 1988 that ‘the government’s own finances are very 
sound indeed. The public sector finances are more or less in balance … so the current 
account deficit is clearly not associated with excessive spending or borrowing by 
government.’ (Lawson 1988, 16) Lawson continued; 
 
some see a currency account deficit … as a sign of economic weakness – 
‘Britain in the red’, as the newspaper headlines are wont to put it. But of 
course a current account deficit is manifestly not at all like a company running 
at a loss. A better analogy is with a profitable company raising funds overseas 
– either borrowing, or reducing its holdings of overseas assets, or attracting 
new equity. A country with greater investment opportunities than it could 
finance from retained profits would look for additional funds from outside. A 
country in a similar position will draw on the savings   of the world, which is 
particularly easy in today’s global markets (1988, 17). 
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Thus in 1988, a year described by one commentator as ‘the annus terribilis of 
Britain’s external accounts’ (Johnson 1991, 210), Lawson took the view that the 
current account deficit was ‘entirely the result of private individuals and businesses 
making choices about their own financial affairs … provided the firm financial 
framework is in place, a period of private sector induced current account deficit 
should give no cause for concern, particularly give this country’s exceptionally high 
levels of net overseas assets’ (Lawson 1988, 18). Lawson’s ‘studied indifference to 
the balance of payments’ (Johnson 1991, 208) effectively meant that he simply did 
not recognize there to be any balance of payments constraints on his stewardship of 
the UK economy, despite assertions by many economic studies at the time that the 
Government should have been alive to the possible balance of payments constraints 
(Coutts & Godley 1992; McCombie & Thirlwall 1992). Lawson’s characterization of 
the current account deficit as ‘benign and self-correcting’ shows how subject to 
change ‘the determination that a particular country is running a chronic payments 
deficit or surplus’ (Block 1977, 140) can be, and that changing approaches to this 
process of determination can affect the ‘very serious international political 
implications’ (Block 1977, 140) which are deemed to follow from payments 
imbalance. 
 
The sizeable current account deficits registered continuously after 1987, Snowden and 
Milner noted in 1992, were, ‘in marked contrast to earlier epochs’ being ‘financed 
without drama by an increasingly integrated global capital market.’ Indeed,   given the 
availability of capital market financing, ‘the question arises when, if at all, current 
account deficits should be a matter of policy concern’. Their conclusion was that 
‘international creditworthiness, rather than a country’s underlying wealth, is the 
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operative constraint’ (Snowden and Milner 1992, 1 & 2). Paradoxically, it was the 
temporary return to fixed exchange rates in the ERM in 1990-1992 which helped to 
bring about an a major improvement in the current account, by causing a major 
recession in the economy. 
 
A rather different gloss on the policies of this period was given by the Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury in 1996. In a broad survey of economic policy, he argued 
that ‘since the late 1970s’ macroeconomic policy had become much less ambitious, 
and one of the lost ambitions was the attempt to treat reducing the balance of 
payments deficit as a policy goal’ (Burns, 1996: 3-4). This account, and its 
implication that the payments position will be self-correcting if the monetary and 
fiscal framework is got right, aligned comfortably with the prevailing neo-liberal 
political economic orthodoxy of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
New Labour and the Balance of Payments  
 
Since the accession of New Labour in 1997 the current account has shown almost 
continuous deterioration as the economy has experienced uninterrupted growth and 
moved towards full employment. This deterioration has evoked little public anxiety. 
Some commentators have argued that this reflects continuing weaknesses in 
underlying performance, (e.g. McCombie and Thirlwall 2004), but these have 
received little prominence. The government’s position has, unsurprisingly, not 
emphasised the ‘fiscal theory of the deficit’, because the Keynesian policies of budget 
deficit financing pursued under Gordon Brown have been pursued rather defensively, 
and the argument that they have consequences for the payments position has not 
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found favour (Clift and Tomlinson, 2007). Instead, the government has emphasised 
the ease of financing of the deficit because their policies have made Britain such an 
attractive destination for foreign investment. The Financial Statement and Budget 
Report for 2007 notes the trade deficit of 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2006, and then 
simply states that ‘Significant income surpluses continued to offset the deficit on trade 
in goods and services’, leading to a current account deficit of 3 per cent (Treasury 
2007, 260). There follows a detailed discussion of how Britain continues to have a 
substantial surplus on foreign investment income, despite having substantially more 
international investment liabilities than assets (Treasury 2007, 261-2). Implicit in this 
story is that squaring the payments circle relies upon Britain combining high levels of 
attractiveness to foreign investment with lower levels of return on those investments 
than British companies are earning on their foreign assets. There is no discussion of 
the sustainability of this position.  
 
From Manser’s work at the end of the 1960s, through to Lawson in the 1980s a 
recurrent neo-liberal argument has been that the problem of the balance of payments 
is essentially a problem of government misbehaviour, and that if this is reformed, and 
free markets sustained, the virtues of the private sector will effectively abolish the 
payments problem. This position seems to have in essence been adopted by New 
Labour; for the time being at least, as regards the balance of payments, we have the 
dominance of ‘the economics of Dr Pangloss’ (Buiter 1980).  Yet this exploration of 
the politics of balance of payments assessment over the last 50 years suggests that 
assumptions about untrammelled free markets ‘solving’ the problem are difficult to 
sustain. Therefore the luxury of this Panglossian assessment of the balance of 
payments situation may not be afforded to UK governments indefinitely. Thompson, 
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for example, identifies the recent balance of payments performance as a ‘potential 
weakness’ in New Labour’s political economic strategy, because ‘the New Labour 
Government has escaped any consequences for sterling of the burgeoning current 
account deficit for reasons that seem to have more to do with the dollar’s weakness 
than any permanent indifference of investors in the present international economy to 
current account weakness’ (forthcoming, 12 & 19).  
 
As this analysis has demonstrated, the political salience of balance of payments 
indicators is contingent upon political circumstances. The atmospheric conditions 
surrounding balance of payments assessment are notoriously changeable, and the ebb 
and flow of its political resonance tends to be somewhat arbitrary. What is clear is that 
New Labour certainly does not control (and may not fully understand) the conditions 
under which this contingent non-salience of its poor balance of payments performance 
obtains. Should the shifting sands of balance of payments assessment move in an 
unhelpful direction, the balance of payments ‘problem’ which dominated British 
politics and British economy policy making for much of the post-war era may return 
with a vengeance.  
 
The arbitrariness inherent in balance of payments, and the fact that ‘real’ impacts do 
not always  flow from any ‘economic fundamentals’, or follow any economic logic, 
mean that we cannot determine how, when and why the balance of payments might 
come to matter again. We can only identify possible sources of increased salience, 
and note the kinds of factors this salience has hitherto been contingent upon. The 
value of sterling vis-à-vis the dollar and Euro has been dropping in 2007-2008. 
Should this process continue, it could generate concerns about the British economic 
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performance and credibility more broadly, and could well increase the sensitivity (and 
significance in the eyes of global financial market actors) of a wider set of economic 
data, including, potentially, balance of payments assessments. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The UK balance of payments is not characterised by the ‘objective’ facts of 
economics textbooks in the neo-classical tradition, but by ‘social facts’. These are 
contingent historical phenomena, and UK balance of payments performance 
assessment is a combination of shifting, conjunctural, constructions rooted in 
underlying political economic assumptions. Significant changes have been seen not 
only in the importance attached to balance of payments performance assessments, but 
also in how the balance of payments measurements and assessments were arrived at. 
This further illustrates how balance of payments assessment is contingent upon the 
structures and institutions of the wider global political economy in which it is carried 
out, be it the fixed exchange rate regime and the Bretton Woods order, or the 
‘decentralized globalization’ of credit creation since the 1970s (Germain 1997,  91).  
 
Our analysis highlights the political economic significance (and normative 
underpinnings) of the interpretive framework within which balance of payments 
assessment is situated. In the UK context, the balance of payments ‘problem’ is 
interwoven with broader ideological issues, or principles of political economy. These 
underlying political economy paradigms are crucial to understanding the construction 
of the balance of payments as a social fact. At different points in the post-war era, 
widely different views were taken of the desirability (or otherwise) of heightened 
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capital mobility, of short-term and long-term capital flows, and of public and private 
investment and spending. In each case, the particular prevailing wisdom fed through 
into a particular framing and mode of assessment of the balance of payments. 
 
The Polanyian notion of congruence between domestic policies and institutions and 
global political economic conditions explains the rise and decline of an ‘embedded 
liberal’ view of the balance of payments. Indeed, the eventual abandonment of the 
balance of payments as a policy goal in context of heightened capital mobility can be 
accounted for because the changing global political economic conditions made it too 
difficult to achieve. At the same time a neo-liberal laissez faire paradigm (analogous 
to the earlier 19
th
 Century ‘liberal creed’) could be invoked to argue it did not matter, 
and the process could be left to ‘self-regulating’ markets.  
 
The increased ability to resort to private borrowing by economic actors and 
governments within certain advanced economies, particularly in the wake of capital 
account liberalization, helps account for the reduced salience of balance of payments 
issues within policy debates. In the contemporary period, for as long as global bond 
market and other financial market actors do not pay attention to balance of payments 
considerations for the UK and other advance economies, the balance of payments 
does not matter. This could change, but there is no compelling reason to expect that 
any change in this situation would be rooted in ‘the economic fundamentals’. Certain 
other changes within the global political economy could make such a shift more or les 
likely – for example were prevailing perceptions of the benign nature of the US 
balance of payments deficit to shift in an adverse direction. Unless and until a new 
prescriptive discourse regarding appropriate (and more importantly inappropriate) 
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balance of payments configurations for advanced economies like the UK gains 
ground, achieving UK payments balance will remain the forgotten economic 
‘fundamental’.  
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Table 1 
 
UK Official balance of payments statistics 1970-2006 
 
Balance of Payments: Trade in Goods & Services: Total balance: CP SA 
 
1970 437   
1971 795   
1972 -71   
1973 -1770   
1974 -4123   
1975 -1798   
1976 -1398   
1977 1035   
1978 2243   
1979 750   
1980 5158   
1981 7189   
1982 5077   
1983 2458   
1984 -918   
1985 3351   
1986 -3214   
1987 -4885   
1988 -17103   
1989 -21081   
1990 -14370   
1991 -6121   
1992 -7448   
1993 -6325   
1994 -4617   
1995 -3066   
1996 -2518   
1997 1764   
1998 -7141   
1999 -15454   
2000 -19361   
2001 -26789   
2002 -30875   
2003 -29445   
2004 -34975   
2005 -44242  
2006 -46532   
2007 -49199  
 
Updated on 19/ 3/2008 
Source: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ 
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Table 2 Office for National Statistics Total official reserves 1970-2006 
  LTCV 
1970 -125 
1971 -1536 
1972 692 
1973 -228 
1974 -105 
1975 655 
1976 853 
1977 -9588 
1978 2329 
1979 -1059 
1980 -291 
1981 2419 
1982 1421 
1983 607 
1984 908 
1985 -1758 
1986 -2891 
1987 -12012 
1988 -2761 
1989 5440 
1990 -76 
1991 -2679 
1992 1407 
1993 -698 
1994 -1045 
1995 200 
1996 510 
1997 2380 
1998 164 
1999 639 
2000 -3915 
2001 3085 
2002 459 
2003 1559 
2004 -196 
2005 -656 
2006 425 
2007 -1191 
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LTCV  BoP: FA: Assets: Reserves: Total official reserves (ONS) 
 Not seasonally adjusted 
 Updated on 19/ 3/2008 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase 
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